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SYMPOSIUM ON NEW DIRECTIONS
IN FEDERALISM
INTRODUCTION
Alan J Heinrich*
Few issues have divided the Rehnquist Court as deeply and visibly as federalism concerns. A narrow majority of the Court (comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor,
Thomas, and Kennedy) has molded a new, judicially enforceable
federalism. This majority has imposed increasing limits on the political branches of the federal government, striking down some laws
because they exceeded Congress's enumerated powers and hence invaded the general police power of the States, 1 while striking down
other laws-laws that concededly regulated subjects within the legitimate scope of federal power-because they employed an illegitimate regulatory means, e.g., "commandeering" state officials 2 or
subjecting states to private lawsuits.3 Four justices (Justices Souter,
Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg) have consistently decried the rise of
this judicially enforceable federalism, contending that the political4
branches alone are responsible for protecting federalism values.
The majority's "judicial activism" on behalf of states' rights, these
dissenters maintain, "should be opposed whenever the opportunity
arises ' 5 and they predict that the course charted by the Rehnquist
Court's new federalism will be short-lived.6

* J.D. Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2000.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
2. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5 and 99-29, 2000 U.S.
LEXIS 3422, at *81 (May 15, 2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
5. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S.Ct. 631, 654 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
6. See Morrison, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3422, at *92 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The Symposium papers that follow address the implications of
the Rehnquist Court's new federalism at both a theoretical as well as
a practical level. Some papers explore the new federalism for its
doctrinal significance and coherence. Others consider the pragmatic
consequences of the new federalism for intellectual property rights
and environmental law enforcement.
The focus of the Symposium is on the "instrumental" component of the Rehnquist Court's new federalism as reflected in the 1999
sovereign immunity trilogy of Alden v. Maine,7 Florida Prepaid
PostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,8
and College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board,9 as well as the Tenth Amendment anticommandeering cases of Printz v. United States 1° and New York v.
United States." Several of the papers also address the "substantive"
component of the new federalism, that is, Court-imposed limitations
on the scope of congressional power set forth in cases such as Lopez,
13
12
City of Boerne v. Flores, and Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents.
As this issue went to press, the Rehnquist Court handed down
14
another landmark federalism decision, United States v. Morrison.
In Morrison, the same five-justice majority struck down the Violence
Against Women Act' 5 as beyond the reach of the enumerated powers
of the federal government. Morrison extended the Court's decision
in United States v. Lopez 16 by further limiting the scope of the Commerce Clause. Under Morrison, it will be virtually impossible for
Congress to regulate noneconomic activity pursuant to its Commerce
Clause power. Morrison also narrowed the scope of Congress's
power under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court repudiated dicta
commanding a majority in United States v. Guest 17 that suggested

119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
13. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

14. Nos. 99-5 and 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 3422 (May 15, 2000).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).

16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
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Congress could regulate private conduct pursuant to its Section 5
power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Morrison demonstrates
that the Rehnquist Court will continue to try to limit the power of the
federal government and will continue to restrict both the ends as well
as the means of congressional legislation.
The first set of papers explores the implications of the new federalism from the perspective of constitutional doctrine.
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky exposes what he tenns the "hypocrisy" of Alden v. Maine. The conservative justices who comprised the majority in Alden discovered a new constitutional right for
states, the right to be immune from suit brought under federal law in
state court. This right is not expressed in the text of the Constitution,
it was not articulated by the Framers, and there is no tradition recognizing such a right. And yet these same conservative justices will
not extend constitutional rights for individuals in the absence of textual support in the Constitution, clear evidence of the Framers' intent, or an unbroken tradition of protecting the right. Professor
Chemerinsky contends that this abrupt shift in constitutional interpretive methodology by the majority can only be explained one way:
Alden represents nothing more than a value choice by the conservative justices. Professor Chemerinsky further contends that the majority made the wrong value choice: the rule in Alden conflicts with
both the Supremacy Clause and fundamental due process principles.
Adam Cox turns to a different instrumental principle of the new
federalism, the "anti-commandeering" rule announced in New York
v. United States and Printz v. United States, which prevents the federal government from enlisting state officials to administer a federal
regulatory program, effectively turning them into puppets of the federal government. While the anti-commandeering rule has been criticized by numerous commentators for a variety of reasons, Mr. Cox
argues that it upholds important federalism values when it is viewed
in light of an expressivist approach to legal analysis. According to
Mr. Cox, the prohibition on the federal government's commandeering of state officials reinforces public perceptions of state autonomy.
Such public perceptions of state autonomy, in turn, help preserve the
states as vibrant alternative political institutions capable of serving as
effective counterweights to the federal government. Thus, when
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viewed from an expressivist perspective, the anti-commandeering
rule helps maintain a healthy balance of power between the federal
and state governments and solidifies the role of the states as a check
on federal overreaching.
Professor Evan Caminker explores the scope of Congress's
authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment through an
examination of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Professor Caminker contends that there is no sound basis for a categorical
rule preventing Congress from regulating private conduct pursuant to
this power, as the Fourth Circuit 18 and now the Supreme Court 19
have done. If we accept the premise-one not challenged by either
court-that Congress amassed a factual record demonstrating a constitutionally cognizable "underprotection" of female victims of violence on the part of state and local law enforcement agencies, Congress, according to Professor Caminker, should be able to remedy
this unconstitutional state action by proscribing and punishing the
underlying private conduct. First, VAWA deters the unconstitutional
state (in)action by raising the profile of the issue, with the likely result that state and local officials would be more sensitive to the
problem and hence more vigorously pursue perpetrators of violent
crimes against women. Further, VAWA quite literally "remedies"
the unconstitutional state action by compensating the victims of the
unconstitutional conduct. The fact that the compensation comes
from private parties rather than from the state actors themselves does
not render VAWA any less a remedy. Finally, Professor Caminker
notes that VAWA's scheme of private remediation actually creates
less tension for federal-state relations.
Professor Melvyn Durchslag explores the doctrinal tension between the Court's substantive federalism decisions and its instrumental decisions such as Alden. He argues that the Court's sovereign
immunity decisions fail to promote state autonomy, the ultimate objective of federalism, in a doctrinally coherent manner. Further, the
decisions entirely ignore the statutory and constitutional rights of individuals. Professor Durchslag advocates a balancing approach

18. See Brzonkala v. Morrison, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999).
19. See United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5 and 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS
3422 (May 15, 2000).
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to state immunity, focusing on the intrusiveness of the proposed
remedy on legitimate state interests.
The second set of papers focuses on the practical implications of
the Court's instrumental federalism decisions, particularly the 1999
sovereign immunity trilogy, for the fields of intellectual property,
environmental law, and mass tort reform legislation.
Professor Peter Menell argues that the pragmatic consequences
of the Court's state sovereign immunity rulings for owners of intellectual property will be minimal. To begin with, Professor Menell
points out that intellectual property owners are not without legal recourse against state infringers. In addition to prospective injunctive
relief against state officials under Ex parte Young,2° intellectual
property owners may pursue a variety of state inverse condemnation,
tort, intellectual property, and contract claims in state court. Professor Menell provides a compendium of the available claims, along
with a survey of state statutes and decisional law relating to waivers
of state sovereign immunity. In addition, Professor Menell believes
that there are inherent institutional constraints on state officials
which make widespread state infringement extremely unlikely. Like
Justice Kennedy, who believes that the good faith of the states is sufficient to ensure the continuing supremacy of federal law,2 1 Professor
Menell argues that the social norms of government institutions and
the public accountability of state officials provide assurance that
states will continue to respect intellectual property rights.
At the same time, Professor Menell suggests that the Florida
Prepaiddecisions may nonetheless pose certain problems for intellectual property enforcement-specifically, in the international
arena. He contends that states' immunity from suit for infringement
of intellectual property rights is inconsistent with the terms of the
TRIPs, NAFTA, and WIPO agreements. It is possible, then, that the
Florida Prepaid decisions could undermine efforts by the United
States to demand that other nations fully comply with these agreements and respect intellectual property rights of United States businesses and citizens.

20. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
21. See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999).
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Professor Robert Bone, like Professor Menell, does not predict
widespread state infringement of intellectual property rights in the
wake of the FloridaPrepaiddecisions, but he nevertheless believes
that these decisions will produce substantial indirect costs, particularly in the context of public university-private sector partnerships.
While avenues of legal recourse remain for intellectual property
owners aggrieved by state officials and agencies, Professor Bone
points out that these avenues, such as state intellectual property laws
and federal injunctive relief, offer much less than full protection.
Private parties desiring to enter into research partnerships with state
universities will accordingly have to devise other strategies in order
to protect themselves in the event of infiingement. These strategies
include demanding a premium from their state partners; keeping their
intellectual property secret for a greater period of time; and formulating alternative research programs. Each of these strategies involves substantial social costs. Further costs result from states' immunity from declaratory relief where the state is the owner of the
intellectual property in question. Professor Bone concludes with the
observation that, under Florida Prepaid, Congress's options for
dealing with the costs of sovereign immunity are all the more limited
to the extent that these costs are felt in ways other than widespread
state infiingement.
Professor William Araiza considers the implications of state
sovereign immunity, as set forth in cases such as Alden and Seminole
22 for enforcement of federal environmental law.
Tribe v. Florida,
Professor Araiza observes that state sovereign immunity is one of
several structurally based constitutional rules developed by the
Rehnquist Court to restrict private parties' ability to bring suit to enforce federal law. While these rules include limitations on the availability of both prospective injunctive relief as well as retrospective
damages, Professor Araiza argues that state sovereign immunity will
pose much greater problems for liability-creating statutes such as
CERCLA than for statutes establishing ongoing regulatory programs.
Professor Araiza concludes that Congress may effectively circumvent the problems created by Alden and Seminole Tribe by

22. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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conditioning the states' participation in federal environmental programs on their waiver of sovereign immunity.
Professor Georgene Vairo turns to an exploration of congressional federalism-specifically, the federalism implications of congressional proposals to limit state court jurisdiction over mass tort
claims. Professor Vairo provides an overview of the ebb and flow of
mass tort class action suits in the federal courts. Currently, the class
action plaintiffs' bar regards state courts as the favored forum to resolve mass tort cases. Professor Vairo points out that congressional
efforts to preclude state court jurisdiction over such cases are not
only ironic, given that the proponents of these proposals are often
conservative, states' rights advocates, but they may even run afoul of
the Rehnquist Court's new federalism.
The final set of papers looks ahead to consider potential future
directions for the Rehnquist Court's new federalism.
Professor Richard Levy explores the limits of the major sources
of congressional power other than the Commerce Clause: the Reconstruction Amendments and the Spending Clause. With the Court
narrowing the scope of Congress's lawmaking authority under the
Commerce Clause, Professor Levy contends that these other sources
of federal power will come under increased scrutiny. In fact, as this
issue went to print, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Civil Rights
Cases23 holding that Congress may not regulate private conduct pursuant to its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 Together with the restrictive "congruence and proportionality" test the Court has adopted to analyze the "appropriateness" of
congressional legislation passed pursuant to Section 5,25 Congress
would seem to be left with little prophylactic power under Section 5.
Further, Professor Levy notes that Section 5 will not likely be an effective basis for legislation passed prior to the Rehnquist Court's
new federalism for the simple fact that Congress had no reason to
suppose it necessary to develop a factual record sufficient to meet the
current "congruence and proportionality" test.
23. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
24. See United States v. Morrison, Nos. 99-5 and 99-29, 2000 U.S. LEXIS
3422 (May 15, 2000).
25. See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Professor Levy suggests that Congress's power under the
Spending Clause may be next to receive the Rehnquist Court's attention. In particular, the stage may be set for the Court to apply
heightened scrutiny to Congress's conditional spending programs,
currently analyzed under the rather deferential test articulated in
South Dakota v. Dole,26 effectively translating the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to the realm of federalism. For example, the
Court may insist on a closer connection between the condition and
the purposes of the expenditure. The Court may also review the "coercive" nature of the condition with heightened scrutiny. On the
whole, however, Professor Levy believes that the new federalism
will not substantially limit the scope of congressional power; rather,
it will most likely have the salutary affect of increasing the attentiveness of lawmakers to federalism concerns.
Professor Michael Wells engages in a close reading of Florida
Prepaidand argues that the case may be interpreted as an effort by
the Court to create a new, higher standard for stating a substantive
due process claim. Professor Wells suggests that Florida Prepaid
may have broad significance for constitutional litigation generally,
presaging a more constricted interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment rights and further limits on Congress's authority to control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Finally, Professor James Wilson returns to the theme raised by
Professor Chemerinsky: the Court's sovereign immunity doctrine
can be regarded as a simple expression of the majority's value
choices and hostility to constitutional or federal statutory rights. In
this regard, Professor Wilson notes the ironic convergence of the
Court's federalism jurisprudence with the criticism of "rights talk"
by left-leaning academics such as Richard Rorty. Professor Wilson
predicts that the Rehnquist Court is likely to create further limits on
individual rights in the coming Terms.

26. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).

